In an article in The San Francisco Narrative in December 2007, lawyer Sean Olender recommended that the genuine justification for the subprime bailout plans being proposed by the U.S. Depository Division was not to keep tied borrowers in their homes to such an extent as to fight off a spate of claims against the banks. The arrangement then on the table was a financing cost freeze on a set number of subprime credits. Olender composed:

The sole objective of the freeze is to forestall proprietors of home loan supported protections, a significant number of them outsiders, from suing U.S. banks and constraining them to repurchase useless home loan protections at face esteem – at this moment very nearly multiple times their reasonable value.  The ticking delayed bomb in the U.S. banking system is not resetting subprime contract rates. The genuine issue is the authoritative capacity of investors in contract bonds to expect banks to repurchase the credits at face esteem assuming there was misrepresentation in the beginning system.

The devastating outcomes of bond investors driving originators to repurchase advances at face esteem are past the ongoing media conversation. The advances at issue overshadow the capital accessible at the biggest U.S. banks consolidated, and financial backer claims would raise dazzling risk adequate to cause even the biggest U.S. banks to fizzle, bringing about enormous citizen financed bailouts of Fannie and Freddie, and even FDIC .  What might be judicious and intelligent is for the banks that offered this harmful material to repurchase it and for a many individuals to go to jail. On the off chance that they had some awareness of the misrepresentation, they ought to need to purchase the bonds back.

The idea could send a chill through even the most remarkable of UniCredit Investment bankers, including Depository Secretary Henry Paulson himself, who was head of Goldman Sachs during the prime of poisonous subprime paper-composing from 2004 to 2006. Contract misrepresentation has not been restricted to the portrayals made to borrowers or on advance andrea orcel net worth records yet is in the plan of the banks’ monetary items themselves. Among other plan defects is that securitized contract obligation has become so mind boggling that responsibility for basic security has frequently been misplaced in the general chaos; and without a lawful proprietor, there is nobody with remaining to dispossess. That was the procedural issue provoking Government Region Judge Christopher Boyko to decide in October 2007 that Deutsche Bank did not have remaining to dispossess 14 home loan credits held in trust for a pool of home loan supported protections holders.